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s 17930 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE October 9, 1975 
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. 
GLENN). The Senator from Montana. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it 
was refreshing once again, in a moment 
of potential crisis, to listen to the dis-
tinguished Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. 
NELSON) state the true history of the 
Gulf of Tonkin resolution and the part 
he played in It, about which I will have 
something to say shortly. 
But I would point out, Mr. President, 
that we had better stop, look and listen 
now, and recognize the potentialities In-
volved In the legislation before the Sen-
ate.today. 
This is just the first ~mall and prob-
ably least expensive step on a long jour-
ney which will begin with the sta-
tioning, I assume, of American civilian 
technicians In the Sinal between the Is-
raeli and the Egyptian troops located 
thereon. 
It takes nothing into consideration 
coocerning· what will happen on the 
Golan Heights. Will there be American 
technicians stationed there? And at what 
cost? 
Nothing is being said about the neXt 
step, probably the West Bank of the Jor-
dan. Will American civllian technicians 
be stationed there? Perhaps. And at what 
cost? 
It says nothing about the difficulties 
inherent In bringing about a settlement 
for the old clt7 ot Jerusalem. 
It says nothing aboUt S~ al-
Shelkh. 
It says nothing about ~e PLO. 
So I want to raise a warning, if I may, 
that this is the first small step toward 
what can become a real involYement as 
far as this Nation is coneemed and, for 
the first time in this situation, a direct 
involvement. 
Mr. President, I oppose this resolution. 
Senators should not be under any illu-
sion. This is not simply a resolution to 
authorize the President to send 200 ci-
vilian technicians to the Sinai. 
It is a resolution to alter radically the 
United States' role in the Middle East, 
the most volatile and dangerous area 
In the world. 
It is a resolution which would result 
in the Senate's Ignoring the treaty pro-
visions of the Constitution. 
It is a resolution which will trigger 
far-reaching commitments to Israel and 
Egypt without either Congress or the 
American people knowing the extent of 
those commitments. 
rinally, It is a resolution which has 
onW;.ous parallels to Congress consid-
eration of the Gulf o! Tonkin resolution. 
Eleven years ago the Congress, In great 
h ;:.s':c, approved the Gulf of Tonkin reso-
lution. Then, as now, there were pleas 
n.;m the executive branch for speedy 
:'dion. No member o! this body con-
I ,•mplated that his vote for that resolu-
on would lead to 11 years of war and 
nore than a third of a million American 
-.asualties. 
The 303,000 Americans were wounded, 
more than 55,000 Americans are dead, 
and the cost w111 reach about $400 b11llon 
before the end of the first half of the 
next century. 
At that time our role In Vietnam was 
only as advisers . No change In that role 
was intended by Congress In passing that 
resolution, as the distinguished Senator 
from Wisconsin has so aptly brought out. 
He referred not to the Gulf of Tonkin 
resolution as being responsible for our 
participation In Vietnam, that Is, the 
Congress, but when we voted the first 
appropriation bUl. 
Here, too, we have a resolution rather 
Innocuous on its face, contemplattng 
only the sending of a llmfted number of 
civllian technicians. But, as we should 
have learned from our experience in In-
dochina, all too often, events, not good 
intentions, shape, and control policy. 
There Is another uncanny reminder of 
the Gulf of Tonkin resolution here. On 
Wednesday, the Foreign RelaUons Com-
mittee Initially approved an amendment 
to the text of the House resolution which 
would have eliminated the Implication In 
s~tion 5 of the resolutkm before us that 
the President has inherent authority to 
make the commitments contained in the 
underlying secret agreements with Israel 
and Egypt. Later, the committee reversed 
Itself and struck out that amendment on 
the grounds that chanalng the resolution 
would risk having to go to conference 
with the House and delay final congres-
sional action on the measure. We are 
seeing some of the results of that today. 
I recall that during the closing mo-
ments of "the debate on the Gulf Of 
Tonkin resolution Senator NELSON pro-
posed an amendment which would have 
reiterated that the American role in Viet-
nam was to be llm1ted to the giving of 
aid and advice. Senator FuLBRIGHT, the 
floor manager of the resolution, said that, 
although the amendment reflected Presi-
dent Johnson's policy, adoption of It by 
the Senate would probably require a con-
ference with the House and delay final 
passage. History may have taken a dif-
ferent turn if the Senate had done what 
was right rather than what was expedi-
ent, and had followed the advice of the 
distinguished Senator from Wisconsin 
(Mr. NELSON) . 
Mr. President, the sending of American 
technicians to the Sinai changes the na-
ture of our involvement In the Middle 
East. By placing the American flag in 
the middle of the conflict the chances 
of our Involvement in the next round of 
fighting, should It occur, will be greatly 
Increased, as will the danger of a con-
frontation with the Soviet Union. This 
action demeans the peacekeeping role of 
the United Nations, because they are the 
ones who should have furnished the tech-
nicians. Instead of strengthening that 
role we are weakening it. I fear that this 
arrangement for an Israeli withdrawal 
from some 1,500 square miles of sand-
possibly one-tenth, certainly no more, of 
the entire Sin&i-has not enhanced, but 
has dlmlnished, the prospects for an 
overall settlement. 
It will be argued that Congress has 
minimized the danger that the techni-
cians will serve as a tripwire to U.S. mili-
tary involvement in specifying In the 
resolution that the technicians must be 
removed if fighting breaks out and that 
they can be removed by concurrent reso-
lution if Congress thinks they are In dan-
ger. Congress is deluding Itself if it Ulinks 
that these technicians can be pulled out 
without thereby virtually insuring an 
outbreak of fighting. Does the Senate 
want to take on the responsibility for 
triggering another round of fighting? 
And how would we get the technicians 
out? By use of our military forces, _of 
course. 
There are too many potential pitfalls 
which have not been adequately exam-
Ined In connection with this proposal. 
Much stress has been placed on the 
fact that civillans, not military men, will 
be sent to the Sinal. I find no comfort 
In this argument. 
Is the American flag any less involved 
because they will be civilians? 
Are assigned civilians any lesa deserv-
ing of protection by their Nation? 
I think not. A national c6mmitment 
will be involved, either way. 
Although the resolution states that 
passage will not constitute approval.. of 
the underlying agreements, this is but 
an attempt to allow Congress to have i!.i 
cake and eat It, too. No language In this 
resolution, the committee report. or as-
surances from Secretary Klss1nger can 
change the essential fact that the tech-
nicians are a part of a package deal. 
Israel did not sign the pullback agree-
ment in Isolation from the assurances 
contained 1n the secret agreements. 
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These agreements are part and parcel of 
the overall atTangement. 
If there is any doubt on this score, 
the State Department has told the Con-
gress that two of the agreements with 
Israel will not be signed until after Con-
gress has approved the sending of the 
technicians. No congressional approval 
1s sought for those agreements. It is al-
leged by the State Department that they 
are within the President's power to make 
unilaterally. Once the Congress approves 
the sending of the technicians, it is 
morally and politically bound to support 
the package. Congress cannot wash its 
hands of the pledges in the other agree-
ments, without a specific statement of 
disapproval. In action will be construed 
as consent. 
The disclaimer in the resolution re-
minds me of the provision the Senate put 
on the initial Cambodia aid bill in 1970, 
following the beginning or our military 
involvement there. The provision stated 
that by giving aid, the United States was 
not committing Itself to defend Cam-
bodia, thus allowing Congress to say that 
it had not approved any commitment to 
the Lon No! government. But that was 
followed by more than 4 years of doing 
precisely what Congress said we were not 
committed to do. The underlying agree-
ments with Israel and Egypt are there 
and in this resolution Congress has done 
nothing to challenge their validity. 
Executive branch spokesmen have at-
tempted to downplay the significance of 
the underlying agreements, which w111 
not be presented to the Congress for ap-
proval. Yet the Senate's legislative coun-
sel conclude: 
Constitutionally, Agreement E (wlth 
Israel). and possible G (wlth Israel), and 
H (with Egypt), are beyond the power of the 
President to enter Into without the advice 
and consent of the Senate. 
For the last several years the Senate 
has attempted, in various ways to restore 
Congress' proper role in the making of 
foreign policy. This has focused on ef-
forts to restrain the Presidential practice 
of making unilateral commitments to 
foreign countries without congressional 
approval. Three years ago, for example, 
the Senate by a vote of 50 to 6 said that 
any baae agreement of foreign aid pledge 
to. Portugal or Bahrein should be sub-
mitted a.s a treaty, subjects of lnfln1tely 
less signiftcance than the agreements in-
volved here. As distinguished witnesses 
such as George Ball and Paul Warnke 
told the committee, several of the provi-
sions in the agreements involved here 
could be Interpreted as military commit-
ments to Israel. 
But, the Senate Is unable to debate 
the executive branch's interpretation of 
these agreements, which will be signed 
when Congress approves this resolution 
because the State Department's legai 
opinion is classifl.ed "secret." How many 
Members of this body know what is in 
that document? How many can say, in 
the view of the executive branch. what 
the United States is legally committed 
to? 
Yet, in voting for this resolution we 
will be saying to the President, "I do 
not -contest your right or authority to 
make the kind of commitments con-
tained in these four agreements." Con-
gress will again be passing the buck to the 
President, sanctioning h1s making-uni-
laterally-major commitments to foreign 
countries. The Senate will be turning 
back the clock, repudiating the policy 
endorsed in the national commitments 
resolution, by a vote of 70 to 16, that a 
commitment to another nation can come 
only by "means of a treaty, statute, or 
concurrent resolution of both Houses of 
Congress specifically providing for such 
commitment." 
Mr. President, this resolution does not 
face squarely the issue of American pol-
icy and commitments in the Middle East. 
It represents· only the tip of the iceberg 
of the Sinai package of agreements. In 
voting for the resloution, Senators will 
not be voting only on sending 200 tech-
nicians to the Sinal. They will be com-
mitted to this entire package of agree-
ments a.nd the significant change in 
American policy they represent. 
Throughout the course of our involv~­
ment in Indochina the best intentions 
of Presidents and Secretaries of State 
were overridden by events. The costs of 
this package are too high. The risks of 
the course contemplated by this resolu-
tion are too great. 
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